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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
This case arises out of a failed business transaction. Plaintiffs and Appellees 
Syndicate Exchange Corporation ("Syndicate") and Adventure Partners Limited, LLC 
("Adventure") prevailed in the trial court and Syndicate obtained a Judgment against 
Defendant and Appellant Crusher Rental & Sales, Inc. ("Crusher"). The trial court held 
that Crusher was unjustly enriched because it retained a deposit for crushing equipment 
without ever delivering the equipment to the buyer, Buttonwillow Compaction Materials, 
LLC ("BCM"). Defendant Mr. Larry Eilers, a Crusher employee, is not a party to this 
appeal. Defendants Crusher and Eilers also filed Third-Party Complaints against Mr. 
David Silberstein, BCM, and Chapman Summit, LLC ("Chapman"), but these parties are 
not involved in this appeal. Mr. Silberstein is the sole shareholder and sole officer of 
Syndicate, president and general partner of Adventure, and manager of Chapman. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4-103. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Crusher's 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and ruled Syndicate could not be bound by Crusher's 
Default Judgment against BCM. Utah appellate courts review a denial of a motion to 
alter or amend judgment under rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for abuse of 
1 
discretion. Crestwood Cove Apts. Bus. Trust v. Turner, 2007 UT 48, \ 40, 164 P.3d 1247 
("Although a trial court has broad discretion to decide whether to grant relief under [rule 
59], a trial court must grant the motion if the prior decision was clearly erroneous and 
would work a manifest injustice." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Crusher's Motion to 
Disqualify Syndicate's trial counsel, when the trial court determined that there was no 
substantial factual relationship between counsel* s former representation of Crusher and 
counsel's firm's current representation of Syndicate, and that Crusher's former counsel 
did not possess information that would be detrimental to Crusher in the instant case. "The 
proper standard of review for decisions relating to disqualification is abuse of discretion," 
but "to the extent [the Utah Supreme] Court has a special interest in administering the law 
governing attorney ethical rules, a trial court's discretion is limited." Cheves v. Williams, 
1999 UT 86, \ 56, 993 P.2d 191. Further, in order for an appellate court to reverse a 
ruling regarding a motion to disqualify, the appellant "must demonstrate that any error in 
failing to disqualify [trial counsel] was prejudicial." Id. 
3. Whether the trial court's Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law are sufficient to support its legal conclusion that Crusher was unjustly enriched by 
retaining the $55,325.00 deposit it received for the crushing and maintenance equipment 
that it failed to deliver to BCM. Utah appellate courts "review the district court's legal 
2 
conclusions for correctness, and will reverse its factual findings only if they are clearly 
erroneous." 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ^  49, 99 P.3d 801. 
"Furthermore, [Utah appellate courts] afford broad discretion to the trial court in its 
application of unjust enrichment law to the facts." Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B&L Auto, Inc., 
2000 UT 83, *h 9, 12P.3d580. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Pursuant to rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Syndicate 
supplements Crusher's Statement of the Case as follows: 
This action commenced when Syndicate and Adventure brought suit to recover a 
deposit of $55,325.00 paid by Syndicate to Crusher for the rental of concrete crushing 
equipment and purchase of related maintenance equipment. (R. 1-7). This equipment 
was to be used by BCM, which had entered into a contract to crush material at a gravel pit 
in California. (R. 1294, ]J 9). Under a Joint Venture Agreement, Syndicate agreed to 
advance funds on behalf of BCM for the $55,325.00 deposit owed to Crusher for the 
equipment. (R. 1294, ^  15). 
On December 20, 2004, Adventure, a related entity of Syndicate, wired the 
$55,325.00 deposit to Crusher's bank. (R. 1295, H 21). A week later, a BCM 
representative (Gene Kause) arrived at Crusher with transportation to take delivery of the 
equipment. (R. 1295, ^ j 22). Crusher refused, and the equipment was never delivered to 
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BCM. (R. 1295,1|25). 
On March 23, 2005, BCM and Syndicate entered into an agreement entitled 
Assignment of Cause of Action (the "Assignment"). (R. 1134-1137). Under the 
Assignment, BCM assigned its claims against Crusher to Syndicate. (R. 1134, f^ 1). The 
Assignment contained an indemnification provision, whereby Syndicate agreed to 
indemnify BCM for claims related to BCM's claims against Crusher. (R. 1134, ^ 2). The 
Assignment also contained a Governing Law and Venue clause, which states that the 
"Assignment shall be construed, enforced, governed by, interpreted and performed 
pursuant to the internal laws . . . of the state of California" and that "the only proper 
venue for any litigation shall be the San Joaquin County Superior Court." (R. 1136, ^ 
10). Further, the Assignment states that "neither party shall have the right to assign this 
Assignment without the prior written consent of the other party that shall not be 
unreasonably withheld." (R. 1134, |^ 6). Because the Assignment gave Syndicate the 
right to bring BCM's claims for the $55,325.00 deposit paid to Crusher, Syndicate and 
Adventure initiated the instant litigation on April 18, 2005. (R. 1). 
On September 6, 2005, Crusher moved to disqualify Plaintiffs' counsel and his 
entire law firm (Van Cott) on the grounds that "Plaintiffs have legal counsel with a 
conflict of interest that ethically prevents representation of Plaintiffs in this matter." (R. 
43). Crusher argued that Plaintiffs' trial counsel and the Van Cott firm should be 
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disqualified because attorney Scott Lilja, a Van Cott shareholder, had previously 
represented Crusher, its related entities, and its owners. (R. 46-49). Plaintiffs opposed 
the Motion to Disqualify on the grounds that there was no substantial factual relationship 
between Mr. Lilja's previous representation of Crusher and the instant litigation, and 
because Crusher's motion failed to identify any confidential information held by Mr. Lilja 
that would prejudice Crusher in the instant matter. (R. 61-63). 
At the hearing on the Motion to Disqualify, the trial court heard testimony from 
Mr. Lilja, John Gazlay, the president of Crusher (R. 1313, p. 6), and Steve Gilbert, the 
CEO of Crusher (R. 1313, p. 22).] In his testimony, Mr. Gazlay, Crusher's president, 
could not identify any inforaiation that he had told Mr. Lilja that may have bearing on the 
current litigation. 
THE COURT: . . . Did you tell anything to Mr. 
Lilja while he was representing Crusher that might be 
detrimental to you in this lawsuit that's pending? 
THE WITNESS: It's a possibility. I don't know 
anything specific sitting here today, but we were together for 
quite a few years. 
THE COURT: But you can't point to any 
particular information that would have bearing on this current 
suit? 
1
 Mr. Gilbert is also the CEO of Gilbert Development Corporation, which is the majority 
shareholder of Crusher. (R. 1313, p. 22). 
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THE WITNESS: That's correct. 
(R. 1313, p. 18). 
Mr. Gilbert, Crusher's CEO, testified that he had not discussed the present 
litigation with Mr. Lilja. (R. 1313, p. 37.). Mr. Gilbert also testified that the only 
information that Mr. Lilja had been given in confidence related to Crusher's operations. 
THE COURT: Okay. So is there information 
about this particular case that Mr. Lilja has been given in 
confidence? 
THE WITNESS: Well, other than how we can put 
the contract together and on taking down deposits on 
equipment, and then how to operate that, to stay out of this 
very - this very where we're at today, we used his legal 
advice to run our business accordingly. 
THE COURT: But you haven't discussed this 
case-
THE WITNESS: No, sir. 
THE COURT: - particularly. 
THE WITNESS: No, sir. 
(R. 1313, p. 39). 
Mr. Lilja testified that he had no involvement in the present litigation aside from 
reviewing the Complaint. 
Q. Have you done any work at all on that case? 
A. No, I have not. 
Q. Have you been asked to do any work on the 
case? 
A. No, I have not. 
Q. Have you been asked anything at the time that 
case was undertaken, were you asked anything by [trial 
counsel] about Crusher? 
A. No. 
R. 1313, p. 51). 
Mr. Lilja also testified that the allegations in the Complaint were not substantially 
factually related to any work he performed for Crusher or its owners, Cyndi and Steve 
Gilbert. 
Q. In connection with the complaint that you 
reviewed, is there anything in that which is 
substantially factually related matter to anything that 
you ever handled for Crusher? 
A. No. 
Q. Is there anything in that complaint which is 
substantially factually related matter to anything you 
handled or any advice you ever gave to Cyndi or Steve 
Gilbert or any of their companies? 
A. No. 
(R. 1313, p. 51). 
Mr. Lilja also testified that he did not recall conversations with Crusher regarding 
Crusher's "set up, its contracts or its way of doing business." (R . 1313, p. 54-55). 
7 
Specifically, Mr. Lilja "ha[d] no recollection of conferring on contracts in particular" but 
he did recall conferring on the litigation Crusher was involved in. (R. 1313, p. 55). In 
short, Mr. Lilja stated that his brief review of the Complaint "indicated to [him] that 
there's absolutely nothing factually related between this case and any matter [he] . . . 
handled for Crusher." (R. 1313, p. 56). 
After the foregoing testimony, the trial court heard argument on the Motion to 
Disqualify. Crusher's counsel admitted that Crusher did not know if Mr. Lilja possessed 
information that would be harmful to Crusher in this litigation. 
THE COURT: . . . The question is does he have 
information based on his prior representation of you that 
would be harmful to you if his firm is allowed to stay in this 
case. 
MS. GILBERT: And that I don't know. 
(R. 1313, p. 64). 
The trial court then ruled that there was not a substantial factual relationship 
between the two cases. (R. 1313, p. 72 ("I have not seen anything that would indicate a 
substantial factually related manner. It seems to me these are distinct cases.")). The trial 
court further ruled that Mr. Lilja did not possess information that would be detrimental to 
Crusher. (R. 1313, p. 72) ("I've asked you several times to identify what information 
you may have that might by detrimental, and you've indicated that you're not able to 
identify that at this point."). Additionally, the trial court noted "I cannot see any basis for 
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[disqualification] . . . because [Crusher] ha[s]n't identified any information that [Mr. 
Lilja] has that would be even relevant to this case. I don't think the fact that he helped 
you put contracts together helps because in this case we're talking about an oral contract." 
(R. 1313, p. 73). As such, the trial court denied Crusher's Motion to Disqualify. {Id.) 
The litigation then proceeded. Crusher filed a Third-Party Complaint against 
BCM and other entities. (R. 383-430). When BCM failed to respond, Crusher obtained a 
Default Judgment. (R. 508-509). The trial court then held a bench trial on June 7 and 8, 
2007, after which the trial court requested supplemental briefing. Specifically, the trial 
court requested supplemental briefing on "the impact of the default judgment against the 
assignor of the claim, that is, against [BCM]." (R. 1312, p.466). After supplemental 
briefing, the trial court entered a Judgment and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
(R. 1036-1046). 
Crusher moved to alter or amend the judgment, arguing, among other things, that 
Syndicate should be bound by the Default Judgment against BCM. (R. 1048-1072). The 
trial court held a telephonic hearing on Crusher's motion on May 6, 2008. (R. 1289-
1291). In the corresponding order, the trial court ruled that: 
Crusher's Motion to Amend/Alter the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law to be consistent with the Default 
Judgment of [BCM] of January 9, 2007 is DENIED. The 
Default Judgment is binding in this case against BCM 
only. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were 
reached after a two-day bench trial. Crusher has 
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presented no legal authority for the proposition the 
Default Judgment should negate the trial findings. 
(R. 1290) (emphasis added). 
The trial court entered its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
May 26, 2008. (R. 1292). The trial court made several findings regarding the parties, 
including the relationship of Syndicate, its related entities, and its owner: "David R. 
Silberstein is an individual and a California resident. Mr. Silberstein is the sole 
shareholder and sole officer of Syndicate Exchange Corporation, president and general 
partner of Adventure Partners Ltd., and manager of the Chapman Summit, LLC." (R. 
1293, [^ 4). Further, the trial court entered findings explaining the Joint Venture 
Agreement between Syndicate and BCM, (R. 1294, \ 15). 
The trial court found that "Syndicate and BCM understood that upon deposit of 
$55,325.00, the Crushboss Primary Crusher and ancillary equipment would be available 
for delivery to BCM." (R. 1294, % 16). The trial court further found that Adventure 
wired the deposit to Crusher's bank on December 20, 2004. (R. 1295, ^  21). Next, the 
trial court found that "[o]n January 13, 2005, BCM asked Crusher to return the Deposit. 
In an email to Crusher, BCM's representative stated: "Since we can't come to an 
agreement... Please return the $55,325." (R. 1296, <(j 30). The trial court also found that 
"Crusher did not allow Mr. Kause to take the crusher and equipment from the yard. Mr. 
Kause did not return to take delivery of the crusher and equipment and the crusher and 
10 
equipment were never delivered to BCM." (R. 1295, ^  25). 
In its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court concluded 
that "Because there is no contract, Crusher should have refunded the Deposit to 
Syndicate. Crusher was unjustly enriched when it retained the full Deposit." (R. 1297). 
Further, the trial court concluded that "Crusher is entitled to an offset of $13,702.00" for 
holding the crushing equipment off the market. (R. 1297). Finally, the trial court ruled 
that "Syndicate is entitled to judgment against Crusher in the amount of $41,623.00, 
together with interest at the rate of 10% per annum, from January 13, 2005, the date on 
which Crusher should have returned said amount to Syndicate." (R. 1297). Crusher then 
filed a Notice of Appeal (R. 1225-26). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Crusher's Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment, which sought to bind Syndicate by the Default Judgment entered 
against BCM. Crusher improperly categorizes Syndicate as a surety and not an 
indemnitor, which is significant because a surety has a much broader obligation than an 
indemnitor. But even if Syndicate is a surety, several court have refused to bind a surety 
by a default judgment against the principal. Further, a default judgment is not binding on 
another party when a non-defaulting party with similar interests and claims prevails on 
the merits. And, under the common defense doctrine, when multiple defendants are 
11 
involved in a single lawsuit, the defaulting defendants are entitled to take advantage of a 
favorable judgment obtained by a non-defaulting party with similar interests or claims. In 
short, because Syndicate successfully litigated its claim, it cannot be bound by the Default 
Judgment against BCM, which addresses identical factual and legal allegations. 
Second, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Crusher's Motion to 
Disqualify because: (a) the trial court properly determined that the work performed by 
Crusher's former counsel, a current member of Syndicate's trial counsel's firm, was not 
substantially factually related to the instant matter, see Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 
1.9(a)(2004) (amended 2005); (b) Crusher failed to demonstrate that Syndicate's trial 
counsel used information obtained from Crusher's former counsel to the disadvantage of 
Crusher, see Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 1.9(b)(2004) (amended 2005); and ©) because 
Crusher cannot demonstrate that it was prejudiced by the trial court's denial of the Motion 
to Disqualify. 
Third, Crusher's challenge to the sufficiency of the trial court's Amended Findings 
of Fact must fail because the trial court's findings meet the necessary elements of unjust 
enrichment. Consequently, this Court should affirm the rulings of the trial court. 
12 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS BROAD DISCRETION 
BY DENYING CRUSHER'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE 
JUDGMENT, WHICH MOTION SOUGHT TO BIND SYNDICATE 
BY CRUSHER'S DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST BCM. 
In its opening brief, Crusher argues that the trial court erred by "failing to apply 
the BCM judgment against Syndicate." App. Br. at 18. In essence, Crusher is now 
challenging the trial court's denial of Crusher's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. 
Utah appellate courts review a denial of a motion to alter or amend judgment under rule 
59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for abuse of discretion. Crestwood Cove Apts. 
Bus. Trust v. Turner, 2007 UT 48, ^ 40, 164 P.3d 1247. The trial court ruled that the 
Default Judgment "is binding in this case against BCM only. The Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law were reached after a two-day bench trial. Crusher has presented no 
legal authority for the proposition the Default Judgment should negate the trial findings." 
(R. 1290). Crusher argues that under California law,2 Syndicate is BCM's surety in this 
litigation. App. Br. at 22. Crusher further contends that, as a surety, Syndicate is bound 
by the Default Judgment entered against BCM. App. Br. at 27-28. Crusher's argument 
contains several flaws. 
2
 The Assignment of Cause of Action "shall be construed, enforced, governed by, 
interpreted and performed pursuant to the internal laws, and not the law of conflicts, of 
the State of California applicable to agreements, contracts and understandings made and 
to be performed in such state." (R. 1136, ^ 10). 
13 
A. Syndicate is BCM's Indemnitor, Not its Surety. 
Crusher incorrectly categorizes Syndicate as a surety rather than an indemnitor. 
Importantly, the duty of a surety is much broader than that of an indemnitor. "[A] 
contract of surety involves a direct promise to perform the obligation of the principal in 
the event that the principal fails to perform as required by his contract, while, on the other 
hand, a contract of indemnity obligates the indemnitor to reimburse his indemnitee for 
loss suffered, or to save him harmless from liability, but never directly to perform the 
obligation indemnified." Pasternak v. Boutris, 99 Cal. App. 4th 907, 931 (Cal. App. 2d 
Dist. 2002) (alteration in original, internal quotation marks omitted); see also Erickson v. 
Fitzgerald, 96 N.E. 2d 382, 386 (111. App. 1950). Here, the Assignment does not contain 
any language whereby Syndicate promises to perform any obligation of BCM in the event 
that BCM fails to perform that obligation. Rather, the Assignment merely states that 
Syndicate will indemnify BCM. (R. 1134, Tf 2). As such, Syndicate should not be bound 
by the Default Judgment against BCM.3 
3
 Further, to the extent that Crusher's attempt to bind Syndicate to the Default 
Judgment is an assertion of BCM's indemnification rights under the Assignment, Crusher 
lacks standing to make such a claim. See Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air 
Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, ^ 19, 148 P.3d 960 (enumerating elements of standing). Any 
claim that BCM may have against Syndicate for its alleged failure to indemnify belongs 
to BCM and not Crusher. After trial, Crusher obtained an assignment from BCM 
whereby BCM assigned Crusher all of BCM's interest, rights, and title to any claim 
arising out of the Syndicates duty to indemnify and the default judgment. (R. 1090). The 
trial court properly refused to consider the assignment between Crusher and BCM 
14 
B. Even if Syndicate is BCM's Surety, Syndicate is Not Bound by 
the Default Judgment. 
Next, Crusher alleges that a surety is bound by any judgment against its principal. 
App. Br. at 23. Crusher, however, fails to point out to the Court that this area of law is 
unsettled. In Drill South, Inc. v. International Fidelity Insurance Co., 234 F.3d 1232, 
(1 lth Cir. 2000), the case cited by Crusher,4 the court noted that a "[substantial dispute 
exists in the law as to whether a default judgment rendered against a principal is binding 
upon the principal's surety." Id. at 1235. In fact, California courts have determined that 
"[i]t is well established that a judgment against a principal is not binding in a separate 
action against a surety." Nat'I Tech. Sys. v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App. 4th 415, 421 
(Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2002) (alteration in original) (quoting All Bay Mill & Lumber Co. v. 
Surety Co. 208 Cal. App. 3d 11, 17 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1989)). 
In All Bay Mill & Lumber Co. v. Surety Co., 208 Cal. App. 3d 11, 17 (Cal. App. 
because it was not competent evidence, (R. 1297, j^ 34), and that ruling has not been 
appealed. Relying on the assignment agreement between Crusher and BCM, Crusher has 
filed an action against Syndicate in an effort to enforce BCM's indemnification rights, 
(Crusher Rental & Sales, Inc. v. Syndicate Exchange Corporation, et al, Fifth Judicial 
District Court Case No. 080500639). However, for purposes of this case, Crusher lacks 
standing to assert BCM's indemnification rights because BCM did not assign its rights to 
Crusher until after trial. 
4
 Interestingly, Crusher concedes that California law governs the Assignment, see 
App. Br. at 22, n.5, but fails to cite any California law on the subject of Syndicate's 
obligations under the Assignment with respect to the Default Judgment. 
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1st Dist. 1989 ,^ the California Court of Appeal addressed a matter with facts similar to the 
instant case and determined that a default judgment against a principal did not bind the 
surety. Id. at 17-18. There, All Bay Mill & Lumber Co. ("All Bay'), a suppler of 
building materials, brought suit against a contractor and its surety in an effort to collect an 
unpaid balance for materials All Bay supplied to the contractor. Id. at 14. The contractor 
failed to answer the complaint, and the trial court entered a default judgment against the 
contractor. Id. at 17. All Bay then contended that the default judgment against the 
contractor was binding on the surety. Id. The court disagreed and expanded California's 
general rule that "a judgment against a principal is not binding in a separate action against 
a surety" to cases where a default judgment against a principal was obtained in cases 
where the surety was a party. Id. Thus, the court concluded that the surety was not bound 
by the default judgment against the contractor. 
The All Bay court based its decision on the principal that "the surety must be given 
an opportunity to be heard in defense." Id. at 18. Further the court noted: 
"[The surety] do[es] not agree to be absolutely bound by any 
judgment obtained against the principal for official 
misconduct nor to pay any such judgment. They are only held 
for a breach of their own obligations. It is a general 
principle that no party can be so held without an 
opportunity to be heard in defense. This right is not 
divested by the fact that another party has defended on 
the cause of action and has been unsuccessful. As the 
surety did not stipulate that he would be absolutely bound by 
the judgment against the principal or permit him to conduct 
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the defense and be themselves responsible for the result of it, 
the fact that the principal has unsuccessfully defended has no 
effect on their rights." 
Id. at 17-18. (quoting Mahana v. Alexander, 88 CaL App. 111, 120 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 
1927) (emphasis added). Thus, the fact that a principal has been found liable does not 
preclude a surety from defending itself. Assuming, as Crusher argues, that Syndicate is a 
surety, the reasoning in All Bay is equally applicable to the instant matter. Furthermore, 
Syndicate successfully litigated the merits of the case and cannot now be held liable for 
the Default Judgment against BCM. This Court should therefore affirm the trial court's 
denial of Crusher's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. 
C. Syndicate Cannot be Not Bound by the Default Judgment 
Against BCM When Syndicate Successfully Litigated its 
Factually Related Claim at Trial. 
This Court should also affirm the trial court's decision on the ground that a 
judgment for a party after a trial on the merits precludes a default judgment against a 
similarly situated party. "[W]hen defendants are similarly situated, but not jointly liable, 
judgment should not be entered against a defaulting defendant if the other defendant 
prevails on the merits." Gulf Coast Fans, Inc. v. Midwest Electronics Importers, Inc., 740 
F.2d 1499, 1512 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and 
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Procedure, § 2690, 6 Moore, Federal Practice, para. 55.06.).5 Put differenlly, "if at trial 
facts are proved that exonerate certain defendants and that as a matter of logic preclude 
the liability of another defendant, the plaintiff should be collaterally estopped from 
obtaining a judgment against the latter defendant, even though it failed to participate in 
the proceeding in which the exculpatory facts were proved." Farzetta v. Turner & Newall, 
Ltd., 797 F.2d 151, 154 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Nielson v. Chang (In re First T.D. & Inv. 
Inc.), 253 F.3d 520, 532 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[Wjhere a complaint alleges that defendants are 
jointly liable and one of them defaults, judgment should not be entered against the 
defaulting defendant until the matter has been adjudicated with regard to all defendants. 
It follows that if an action against the answering defendants is decided in their favor, then 
the action should be dismissed against both answering and defaulting defendants." (citing 
Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552 (1872)). 
The trial court applied similar logic here when it ruled that the Defaidt Judgment 
"is binding in this case against BCM only. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
were reached after a two-day bench trial. Crusher has presented no legal authority for the 
5
 Because this particular issue has not been addressed by Utah courts, Syndicate 
cites to federal cases that have addressed this issue. See Utah Local Gov't Trust v. 
Wheeler Mack Co., 2008 UT 84, ^ j 14, 619 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 ("Lacking guidance from 
our own statutes and cases, [Utah appellate courts] turn for direction to the law of sister 
states and to other authoritative scholarship on the topic"). 
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proposition the Default Judgment should negate the trial findings." (R. 1290). Although 
BCM and Syndicate were not co-defendants, they were both opposite Crusher. Further, 
the Third-Party Complaint against BCM contained similar facts to Plaintiffs' Complaint 
against Crusher. Indeed, Plaintiffs' Complaint alleged breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment against Crusher because Crusher retained the $55,325.00 deposit. (R. 4). 
Crusher's Third-Party Complaint alleged breach of contract against BCM for the same 
failed transaction. (R. 389-90). It would be unfair and illogical to allow Crusher to 
recover from BCM after the trial court ruled that there was no contract between Crusher 
and BCM, (R. 1295, % and that Crusher had been unjustly enriched (R. 1297, ^  2). As 
such, BCM and Syndicate were similarly situated parties, and Syndicate's Judgment after 
a trial on the merits should trump the Default Judgment against BCM. See Gulf Coast 
Fans, Inc. v. Midwest Electronics Importers, Inc., 740 F.2d 1499, 1512 (11th Cir. 1984). 
D. Under the Common Defense Doctrine, Syndicate's Arguments 
Inure to BCM, 
"Where multiple defendants are involved in a single suit, and some of those 
defendants default, the defaulting defendants are entitled to take advantage of a 
successful defense interposed by the non-defaulting defendants, unless the defense 
interposed was personal to the non-defaulting defendant." Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 252; 
see also Sutter v. Payne, 989 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Ark. 1999); State ex. rel. Everett v. 
Sanders, 544 P.2d 1043, 1045 (Ore. 1976). The common defense doctrine was applied in 
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Sutherland v. Gross, 772 P.2d 1287 (Nev. 1989). There, the plaintiff sought a judgment 
against a party that failed to answer a cross-claim alleging conspiracy. Id. at 1291. 
However, because other parties successfully defended against the conspiracy claim, the 
court held that "the answer of a co-defendant inures to the benefit of a defaulting 
defendant when there exists a common defense as to both of them" and refiised to enter a 
judgment against the defaulting party. Id. 
The same logic applies here. Although BCM and Syndicate are not co-defendants, 
they were both opposite Crusher in the trial court. Syndicate succeed on its unjust 
enrichment cause of action, which precludes Crusher's breach of contract claim. Indeed, 
the trial court dismissed Crusher's Third Party Complaints against Chapman and 
Silberstein, which alleged breach of contract. (R. 1298, ^ f 5). Consequently, BCM is 
entitled to take advantage of Syndicate's success at trial, and this Court should affinn the 
trial court's determination that Syndicate cannot be bound by the Default Judgment 
against BCM. 
H. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
DENYING CRUSHER'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY. 
Crusher argues that because attorney Scott Lilja, a current member of Syndicate's 
trial counsel's firm (Van Cott), represented Crusher in the past, Syndicate's trial counsel 
was operating under a conflict of interest that warranted disqualification under the 
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previous version of rule 1.9 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.6 App. Br. at 18-
19. First, Crusher avers that Mr. Lilja's prior representation and the instant litigation 
involve a substantially factually related matter. App. Br. at 30. Next, Crusher argues that 
disqualification is warranted because Mr. Lilja obtained confidential information that 
Syndicate could use to Crusher's disadvantage. App. Br. at 37. Third, Crusher asserts 
that the trial court's denial of the Motion to Disqualify tainted the lawsuit. App. Br. at 43. 
The trial court properly denied Crusher's Motion to Disqualify because it 
determined that Mr. Lilja's prior representation and this case did not involve a 
substantially related factual matter, and because Mr. Lilja did not possess any infomiation 
that would be detrimental to Crusher. (R. 1313, p. 72-73). This Court reviews "decisions 
relating to disqualification is abuse of discretion." Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, f 56, 
6
 At the time Crusher filed its Motion to Disqualify, Rule 1.9 of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct stated: 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter 
shall not thereafter: 
(a) Represent another person in the same or a substantially 
factually related matter in which that person's interests are 
materially adverse to the interests of the former client. . .; or 
(b) Use information relating to the representation to the 
disadvantage of the former client except... when the 
information has become generally known. 
Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct. 1.9 (2004) (Amended 2005). 
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993 P.2d 191. Further, in order for this Court to reverse the trial court, the appellant 
"must demonstrate that any error in failing to disqualify [trial counsel] was prejudicial." 
Id. As will be discussed below, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
Crusher's Motion to Disqualify, and this Court should affirm. 
A. The Trial Court Properly Determined that the Work Performed 
by Crusher's Former Counsel, a Current Member of Syndicate's 
Trial Counsel's Firm, was Not Substantially Factually Related to 
the Instant Matter. 
First, the trial court properly concluded that Mr. Lilja's prior representation and 
this case did not involve a substantially factually related matter. (R. 1313, p. 72). There 
are simply no facts in the record indicating "a distinct, factual link between the former 
and present representations." Cheves, 1999 UT 86, \ 56. Moreover, "conclusory 
statements concerning the distinct, factual link are not sufficient." Id. f 60 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Here, Crusher was unable to establish any link between the 
current case and Mr. Lilja's prior representation. 
Mr. Gazlay, Crusher's president, could not identify any information that he had 
told Mr. Lilja that may have bearing on the current litigation. 
THE COURT: . . . Did you tell anything to Mr. 
Lilja while he was representing Crusher that might be 
detrimental to you in this lawsuit that* s pending? 
THE WITNESS: It's a possibility. I don't know 
anything specific sitting here today, but we were together for 
quite a few years. 
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THE COURT: But you can't point to any 
particular information that would have bearing on this current 
suit? 
THE WITNESS: That's correct. 
(R. 1313, p. 18). Mr. Gilbert, Crusher's CEO, also testified that the only information that 
Mr. Lilja had been given in confidence related to Crusher's business operations and not 
this case. 
THE COURT: Okay. So is there information 
about this particular case that Mr. Lilja has been given in 
confidence? 
THE WITNESS: Well, other than how we can put 
the contract together and on taking down deposits on 
equipment, and then how to operate that, to stay out of this 
very - this very where we're at today, we used his legal 
advice to run our business accordingly. 
THE COURT: But you haven't discussed this 
case-
THE WITNESS: No, sir. 
THE COURT: - particularly. 
THE WITNESS: No, sir. 
(R. 1313, p. 39). Consequently, the testimony of Crusher's officers, who worked directly 
with Mr. Lilja, fails to establish that Mr. Lilja's prior representation was substantially 
factually related to the instant matter. 
In addition, Mr. Lilja stated that his brief review of Crusher's Complaint 
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"indicated to [him] that there's absolutely nothing factually related between this case and 
any matter [he] ever recall[s] having handled for Crusher." (R. 1313, p. 56). Further, Mr. 
Lilja has not performed any work on this matter: 
Q. Have you done any work at all on that case? 
A. No, I have not. 
Q. Have you been asked anything at the time that 
case was undertaken, were you asked anything by [trial 
counsel] about Crusher? 
A. No. 
R. 1313, p. 51). Thus, Mr. Lilja's testimony bolsters the trial court's conclusion that the 
two cases were not substantially factually related matters. 
Crusher argues that the two matters are substantially factually related because 
Syndicate "is challenging the very business practices that Crusher implemented with 
Lilja's advice." App. Br. at 31. The trial court addressed this concern, however, when it 
stated "I cannot see any basis for [disqualification] . . . because [Crusher] ha[s]n't 
identified any information that [Mr. Lilja] has that would be even relevant to this case. I 
don't think the fact that he helped you put contracts together helps because in this case 
we're talking about an oral contract." (R. 1313, p. 72-73). As such, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion by denying Crusher's Motion to Disqualify on the grounds that the 
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two matters were not substantially factually related.7 
B. Disqualification is Not Required Under the Plain Meaning of 
Rule 1.9(b) Because Crusher Failed to Demonstrate that 
Syndicate's Trial Counsel Used Information to the Disadvantage 
of Crusher. 
Next, Crusher argues that "disqualification is warranted under Rule 1.9(b) [of the 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct] because Lilja obtained confidential information 
from Crusher that his firm may use to Crusher's disadvantage." App. Br. at 37-38. 
Crusher asserts that Mr. Lilja had knowledge of Crusher's business operations and 
strategy, as well as its litigation and trial strategy. App. Br. at 39. According to Crusher, 
if "confidential information was disclosed and could be detrimental, disqualification is 
required." App. Br. at 39. Crusher is mistaken on two fronts. First, Crusher 
misrepresents the standard for disqualification under rule 1.9(b). Second, even under 
Crusher's own test, Crusher failed to show that Syndicate's trial counsel used any 
information obtained by Mr. Lilja's prior representation to the disadvantage of Crusher. 
Former rule 1.9 (b) states: "A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a 
7
 Crusher argues that once a substantial relationship is found there is an 
irrebuttable presumption that the lawyer has acquired confidential information from the 
former client that require's disqualification. App. Br. at 35. Utah courts have not treated 
the presumption in favor of disqualification to be irrebuttable. See Houghton v. Dep't of 
Health, 962 P.2d 58, 62 (Utah 1998). As discussed below, Syndicate has overcome any 
presumption in favor of disqualification because Crusher cannot demonstrate that it was 
prejudiced by the trial court's denial of its Motion to Disqualify. 
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matter shall not thereafter: . . . (b) Use information relating to the representation to the 
disadvantage of the former client except.. . when the information has become generally 
known." Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 1.9(b) (2004) (Amended 2005). Utah courts interpret 
state rules by first analyzing the plain meaning of the rule. See, e.g., State v. Ison, 2006 
UT 26, |^ 16, 135 P.3d 864 (Utah courts "interpret evidentiary rules using the same time-
honored methods we employ to draw meaning from writings generally. Accordingly, we 
look first to the plain meaning of the text [the rule] for guidance."). Under the plain 
meaning of rule 1.9(b), a violation of that rule requires that the attorney actually "use 
information" obtained during the prior representation "to the disadvantage of the former 
client." Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 1.9(b). Crusher's unsupported assertion that 
disqualification is required if "confidential information was disclosed and could be 
detrimental" does not square with the plain and unambiguous language of 1 brmer rule 
1.9(b). This Court should reject such an interpretation of rule 1.9(b). 
However, disqualification would not be required even under the standard 
proposed by Crusher. Crusher failed to identify any information learned by Mr. Lilja that 
would be detrimental to Crusher in this case. The trial court stated: "Fve asked you 
several times to identify what information you may have that might by detrimental, and 
you've indicated that you're not able to identify that at this point." (R. 1313, p. 72). 
Consequently, disqualification of Syndicate5 trial counsel is not required under the plain 
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meaning of rule 1.9(b) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, nor under Crusher's 
interpretation of that rule. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
C. This Court Should Affirm The Trial Court's Denial of Crusher's 
Motion to Disqualify Because Crusher Has Suffered No 
Prejudice. 
Third, in order for this Court to reverse the trial court, Crusher "must demonstrate 
that any error in failing to disqualify [trial counsel] was prejudicial." Cheves v. Williams, 
1999 UT 86, % 56, 993 P.2d 191. Although Crusher argues that allowing the Van Cott 
firm to represent Syndicate "tainted the lawsuit," Crusher cannot make its required 
showing of prejudice.8 
First, the proceedings below indicate that Crusher was not prejudiced. During 
argument on the Motion to Disqualify, Crusher's counsel admitted that Crusher did not 
know if Mr. Lilja possessed information that would be harmful to Crusher in this 
litigation. 
THE COURT:.. . The question is does he have 
information based on his prior representation of you that 
would be harmful to you if his firm is allowed to stay in this 
case. 
8
 Crusher argues that under rule 1.10 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, 
the trial court should have disqualified the entire Van Cott firm. App. Br. at 32-33. 
However, because Syndicate's trial counsel did not violate rule 1.9, rule 1.10 is 
inapplicable. See Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 1.10(a) ("While lawyers are associated with a 
firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing 
alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7 or 1.9 . . . ." (Emphasis added.)) 
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MS. GILBERT: And that I don't know. 
(R. 1313, p. 64). The trial court also specifically ruled that Mr. Lilja did not possess any 
detrimental information. (R. 1313, p. 72) ("I've asked you several times to identify what 
information you may have that might by detrimental, and you've indicated that you're not 
able to identify that at this point.").9 
Second, Crusher cannot show that the trial court's denial of its Motion to 
Disqualify caused prejudice because there is substantial evidence in the record to support 
the trial court's decision. See Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, T| 56 (affirming denial of 
motion to disqualify because "there was sufficient other evidence in the record to support 
he jury's findings"). As will be discussed in Part III of this Brief infra, the trial court 
entered sufficient Findings of Fact to support its conclusion that Crusher was unjustly 
enriched. These facts are independent of any information that may have been obtained 
through Mr. Lilja's former representation of Crusher.10 
Consequently, even if Mr. Lilja's prior representation of Crusher was substantially 
9The trial court stated that Crusher could re-file its Motion to Disqualify if Crusher 
identified "an actual conflict of interest." (R. 1313, p. 72). Crusher failed to do so. 
10Further, Crusher has not alleged that Mr. Lilja advised it on any of the specific 
conduct at issue here. For example, Crusher does not allege that Mr. Lilja advised it not 
to return deposits after a potential purchaser failed to obtain financing. Indeed, the fact 
that litigation resulted from this transaction indicates that this transaction was likely 
contrary to Crusher's normal business operations. 
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related to the present case, this Court should affirm the trial court because Crusher cannot 
demonstrate any resulting prejudice. See Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, ^ | 56 
(affirming trial court's denial of motion to disqualify because appellant could not 
demonstrate prejudice). 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
CRUSHER'S LIABILITY FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
Crusher's third issue on appeal alleges that the trial court's Amended Findings of 
Fact are insufficient to support its ultimate conclusion that Crusher was unjustly enriched 
by retaining Syndicate's deposit. App. Br. at 46. Specifically, Crusher claims that the 
trial court's findings are lacking because there is no finding that Syndicate conveyed a 
benefit upon Crusher and no finding that Crusher's retention of the deposit was 
inequitable under the circumstances. App Br. at 47-48. Crusher's arguments on this issue 
fail for two reasons. First, Crusher has failed to set forth all of the relevant findings in the 
trial court's Amended Findings of Fact. Second, the trial court's Amended Findings of 
Fact are sufficient to support its ultimate conclusion that Crusher was unjustly enriched 
by retaining the $55,325.00 deposit. 
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A. Crusher Failed to Identify All of the Relevant Findings of Fact.11 
Crusher argues that because the trial court "made no finding linking Syndicate 
with Adventure," the trial court did not find that Syndicate conveyed a benefit upon 
Crusher. App Br. at 47. However, Crusher fails to address Finding of Fact number 4, 
which states "David R. Silberstein is an individual and a California residenl. Mr. 
Silberstein is the sole shareholder and sole officer of Syndicate Exchange Corporation, 
president and general partner of Adventure Partners Ltd., and manager of the Chapman 
Summit, LLC." (R. 1293, ^ f 4). This fact demonstrates that Syndicate is linked to 
Adventure through Mr. Silberstein. 
Next, Crusher avers that the trial court failed to make findings that retention of the 
$55,325.00 deposit would "adversely and inequitably affect Syndicate." App. Br. at 48-
49. Here, Crusher ignores Finding of Fact number 30, which states "On January 13, 
2005, BCM asked Crusher to return the Deposit. In an email to Crusher, BCM's 
representative stated: "Since we can't come to an agreement. . . Please return the 
11
 To the extent Crusher is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Crusher has 
failed to marshal the evidence. "To successfully challenge an ultimate finding of fact, an 
appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when 
viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, j^ 
76, 100 P.3d 1177 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 
18, \ 17, 20 P.3d 332 ("Where [a party] fails to so marshal the evidence, [appellate 
courts] need not consider the challenge to the sufficiency of the findings."). 
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$55,325." (R. 1296, ^ j 30). This fact demonstrates that BCM viewed Crusher's retention 
of the deposit as inequitable. Because the trial court entered findings regarding the Joint 
Venture Agreement between Syndicate and BCM, (R. 1294, ^ f 15), it follows that this 
inequity would also affect Syndicate and Adventure. These facts therefore address the 
alleged insufficiencies in the Amended Findings of Fact. 
B. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact are Sufficient to Support its 
Conclusion that Crusher was Unjustly Enriched. 
The trial court's "findings of fact must show that the court's judgment or decree 
follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence. The findings should be 
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. 
Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ^  28, 70 P.3d 35 (internal quotation marks omitted). Utah 
appellate courts "review the district court's legal conclusions for correctness, and will 
reverse its factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous." 438 Main Street v. Easy 
Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ^ 49, 99 P.3d 801. "Furthermore, [Utah appellate courts] afford 
broad discretion to the trial court in its application of unjust enrichment law to the facts." 
Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B&L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, \ 9, 12 P.3d 580. 
There are three elements to an unjust enrichment claim. "First, there must be a 
benefit conferred on one person by another. Second, the conferee must appreciate or have 
knowledge of the benefit. Finally, there must be the acceptance or retention by the 
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conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the 
conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value." Desert Miriah, Inc., 2000 
UT 83, \ 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). The trial courf s Findings of Fact fulfill 
all three of these elements. 
First, the trial court found that Syndicate and Adventure conferred a benefit upon 
Crusher: "On December 20, 2004, Adventure Partners, Ltd. wired $55,325.00 to 
Crusher's Wells Fargo bank account in Cedar City, Utah." (R. 1295, f 21). Second, the 
trial court found that Crusher appreciated or had knowledge of the benefit. Specifically, 
the trial court also found that "[o]n January 13, 2005, BCM asked Crusher to return the 
deposit. In an email to Crusher, BCM's representative stated: "Since we can't come to an 
agreement. . . Please return the $55,325." (R. 1296, ^ f 32). Crusher was therefore on 
notice that BCM expected Crusher to return the deposit. Third, the trial court found that 
Crusher inequitably retained the deposit: "Crusher did not allow Mr. Kause to take the 
crusher and equipment from the yard. Mr. Kause did not return to take delivery of the 
crusher and equipment and the crusher and equipment were never delivered to BCM." 
(R. 1295, Tj 25). In addition, the trial court found that "Syndicate and BCM understood 
that upon deposit of $55,325.00, the Crushboss Primary Crusher and ancillary equipment 
would be available for delivery to BCM." (R. 1294, % 16). These facts demonstrate that 
Syndicate and BCM expected delivery of the crusher and maintenance equipment in 
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exchange for the deposit. When Crusher refused delivery, BCM asked for its deposit 
back. Crusher refused and was therefore unjustly enriched. 
As noted above, the trial court has broad discretion when applying the law of 
unjust enrichment to the facts. Desert Miriah, Inc., 2000 UT 83, ^ f 9. Consequently, the 
trial court's findings of fact are sufficient to support its conclusion that Crusher was 
unjustly enriched by retaining the deposit. This Court should affirm the trial court's 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, Plaintiffs and Appellees Syndicate Exchange 
Corporation and Adventure Partners Limited, LLC respectfully request this Court to 
AFFIRM the rulings of the trial court. 
DATED this 26th day of January, 2009. 
SUITTER AXLAND, PLLC 
JesseC. Trentaaue 
Noah M. Hoagland 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellees 
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